We consider the following (promise) 
Introduction
Zero-Knowledge proofs, introduced by Goldwasser, Micali and Rackoff [16] , are fascinating and extremely useful constructs. Their fascinating nature is due to their seemingly contradictory nature; they are both convincing and yet yield nothing beyond the validity of the assertion being proven. Their applicability in the domain of cryptography is vast; they are typically used to force malicious parties to behave according to a predetermined protocol (which requires parties to provide proofs of the correctness of their secret-based actions without revealing these secrets).
vided one-way functions exist; cf., [13, 19, 4] ), the development of methodologies for the construction of (efficient) zero-knowledge proof systems is still of great importance.
The study of S Z Khas gained much momentum in recent years. In particular, two results which assert transformations of one type of S Z Kproof system into another, have played an important role in recent study. A key notion in these results is the notion of honest-verifier S Z K , denoted HVSZK. Unlike the general notion of S Z K , which requires that no matter what the verifier does, it learns nothing from the interaction with the prover, here one only requires that the "honest" verifier (i.e., one that follows the prescribed protocol) learns nothing from the interaction. The two results referred to above are:
Thm. I: Every promise problem 1 having a honest-verifier S Z Kproof system has also a public-coin honestverifier S Z Kproof system (cf., Okamoto [20] ).
Thm. II: Every promise problem having a public-coin
honest-verifier S Z Kproof system has a (public-coin) general S Z Kproof system (cf., Goldreich, Sahai and Vadhan [14] ).
Combining these two results one obtains that any promise problem having a honest-verifier S Z Kproof system also has a general S Z Kproof system (i.e., one in which zeroknowledge holds with respect to any cheating verifier). We stress the key role of Thm. I in providing the adequate starting point for Thm. II. Furthermore, the starting point provided by Thm. I is relied on also in the following intriguing results:
Thm. III: The class HVSZKis closed under complementation (cf., Okamoto [20] ): That is, if a promise problem has a honest-verifier S Z Kproof system then so has its complement.
Thm. IV:
The class HVSZKhas a natural complete problem (cf., Sahai and Vadhan [24] ).
Thus, Thm. I plays a key role in this area. Unfortunately, the proof of Thm. I in [20] is very complicated and was fully understood by very few researchers.
The primary motivation of this work is to provide a simpler proof of Thm. I. Our basic idea is to apply some of Okamoto's techniques [20] to the Aiello-Hastad transformation [1] of HVSZK into AM, rather than applying them (as done in [20] ) to the Goldwasser-Sipser transformation [17] of I Pinto AM. To further clarify the proof, we introduce a new promise problem, and show that:
(1) any problem in HVSZK reduces to the new promise problem, and (2) the new promise problem has a publiccoin HVSZKproof system. Combining (1) and (2), Thm. I follows. 1 A promise problem is a pair of disjoint sets of strings, corresponding to yes and no instances, respectively [9] .
Statistical zero-knowledge proof systems
Following [12] , we extend the standard definition of interactive proof systems to promise problems = yes ; no . That is, we require the completeness condition to hold for yes instances (i.e., x 2 yes ), require the soundness condition to hold for no instances (i.e., x 2 no ), and do not require anything for inputs which violate the promise (i.e., x = 2 yes no ). This paper focuses on such proof systems which are honest-verifier statistical zero-knowledge: We comment that general statistical zero-knowledge proof systems are such where the zero-knowledge requirement holds for any (polynomial-time computable) verifier stategy, rather than merely for the prescribed/honest verifier V .
Actually, even a stronger requirement can be proven to be equivalent to HVSZK -see [14] .
Public-coin versus general proof systems
Recall that public-coin (a.k.a Arthur-Merlin) proof systems [2, 3] are interactive proof systems [16] in which the prescribed verifier's strategy amounts to sending uniformly chosen messages at each round, and deciding whether to accept by evaluating a polynomial-time predicate of the conversation transcript. That is, in each round, the verifier tosses a predetermined number of coins and sends the outcome to the prover, and at the end it decides whether to accept by applying a predicate to the (full) sequence of messages it has sent and received.
Public-coin proof systems are easier to analyze and manipulate than general interactive proofs, and thus the 2 Recall that a function f: N ! N is negligible if for any polynomial p, fn 1=pn for sufficiently large n.
result of Goldwasser and Sipser [17] by which the former are as powerful as the latter found many applications (e.g., [11, 19, 4] ). As mentioned above, the same and more so is true regarding statistical zero knowledge: That is, Okamoto's result [20] (i.e., Thm. I), by which public-coin HVSZK equals HVSZK, has played a major role in subsequent results (e.g., Thms. II, III, and IVmentioned above). Thus, providing a clear proof of Thm. I is of major importance to this area.
A new HVSZK-complete problem: Entropy Difference
The new promise problem referred to earlier is called Entropy Difference. The promise problem involves the entropies of distributions which are encoded by circuits which sample from them. That is, if X is a circuit mapping f0; 1g m to f0; 1g n , we identify X with the probability distribution induced on f0; 1g n by feeding X the uniform distribution on f0; 1g m . We write HX for the entropy of distribution X (defined in Section 2.1). We believe that this provides a much simpler argument than the one presented in [10, 1] , although it does use all the underlying ideas of these works.) 3 Theorem 1.4 (ED in public-coin HVSZK): ED has a public-coin honest-verifier statistical zero-knowledge proof system.
Definition 1.2 (Entropy
Combining Theorems 1.3 and 1.4, 4 we see that any promise problem in HVSZK has a public-coin HVSZK proof system. Thus, we provide an alternative (and much simpler) proof of Thm. I. Furthermore, observing that ED easily reduces to its complement, it follows that HVSZK is closed under complementation (i.e., we provide an alternative proof of Thm. III).
Discussion: Some superficial similarity does exist between the above and what was done in [24] . In the latter work, the authors defined a promise problem, called Statistical Difference (denoted SD), 5 and showed that it is complete for the class HVSZK. However, their reduction of HVSZK to SD used Thm. I to restrict attention to public-coin HVSZK only. Thus, the results in [24] (relying on Thm. I) cannot be used to establish Thm. I. Furthermore, the HVSZKproof system for SD presented in [24] is not of the public-coin type.
In retrospect, the term statistical zero knowledge (coined by Goldwasser, Micali and Rackoff [16] ) sounds prophetic of the key role played by computational problems regarding statistical measures in the study of this class (which is also known by the name "almost-perfect zero knowledge").
Extensions
Let us stress that by (honest-verifier) statistical zero knowledge we mean a simulation, up to negligible deviation error, by a strict (rather than expected) probabilistic polynomial-time machine. This makes Theorem 1.4 seemingly stronger, but potentially weakens Theorem 1.3. However, as we shortly explain, Theorem 1.3 is in fact stronger than stated. In fact, the proof only utilizes a simulator with deviation smaller than the reciprocal of the (cube of the) total number of bits sent in the proof system. On the other hand, Theorem 1.4 can be strengthened as follows: 
Techniques
As stated above our main results are Theorems 1.3 and 1.4 which establish, respectively, a Karp reduction of HVSZK to ED, and a public-coin honest-verifier S Z K proof system for ED.
The proof of the first main result relies on the works of Fortnow, Aiello and Hastad [10, 1] . The key observation underlying these works is that any simulator establishing the (honest-verifier) S Z Kproperty of a proof system must behave very differently on YES and NO-instances. This difference is used in [10, 1] in order to construct certain constantround proof systems. We use this difference to construct a reduction to ED. Specifically, we use the characterization of the simulator's behavior as provided in [1] and further simplified in [23] . This characterization allows us to reduce instances of any problem in HVSZK to instances of ED.
The proof of the second main result relies on the work of Okamoto [20] . Specifically, we follow his basic idea of "complementary usage of messages" and use two of his subprotocols. We stress that we provide self-contained definitions, implementations and analysis of the latter two subprotocols.
Open Problems
Our proof of Thm. I (as well as the original proof of Okamoto [20] ) actually provides a transformation of proof systems (from private-coin to public-coin while preserving a certain zero-knowledge property, namely HVSZK). Neither our transformation nor Okamoto's preserves the number of rounds in the original proof system, nor the computational complexity of the prover. It would be desirable to present an alternative transformation which does preserve both complexity measures, and it would be of interest even to present a transformation which preserves only one of these measures.
For a wider perspective, we mention the following facts.
1. The transformation of private-coin interactive proofs to public-coin ones (cf., [17] ) preserves the number of rounds (up to an additive constant), but does not preserve the computational complexity of the prover.
(Note that this transformation does not seem to preserve any zero-knowledge property. Furthermore, it is not known how to transform computational zeroknowledge proofs into public-coin ones (without assuming the existence of one-way functions which allows one to construct the latter from scratch).)
2. The transformation of honest-verifier zero-knowledge public-coin proof systems into general zeroknowledge ones (cf., [14] ) preserves the computational complexity of the prover and only increases mildly the round complexity.
(Actually, this transformation preserves both measures, but introduces a noticeable soundness error which can be eliminated by repeating the proof system sequentially any non-constant number of times.)
Organization
In Section 2, we prove Theorem 1.3; that is, we show that every problem in HVSZK reduces to ED. In Section 3, we prove Theorem 1.4; that is, we exhibit a public coin statistical zero-knowledge proof system for ED. This proof system uses two subprotocols which are specified in Section 3 and implemented in Section 4.
HVSZK reduces to ED
In this section, we prove Theorems 1.3 and 1.7, which state that every problem in HVSZK (and weak-HVSZK) reduces to ED. Our reduction is based on the Aiello-Hastad characterization of statistical zero-knowledge [1] . Following Petrank and Tardos [23] , we present the Aiello-Hastad characterization using a formulation of entropy, rather than in the formulation of set sizes used in [1] . In Section 2.1, we define the information-theoretic notions used in the Aiello-Hastad characterization. In Section 2.2, we motivate and state the lemmas which comprise the Aiello-Hastad characterization (with proofs in Appendix A). In Section 2.3, we exhibit the reduction from any problem in HVSZK to ED, prove its correctness using the Aiello-Hastad characterization, and thereby deduce Theorems 1.3 and 1.7.
Entropy and Relative Entropy
Recall the definition of the entropy, denoted HX, of a random variable X:
where all logarithms above and in the sequel are to base 2. The binary entropy function, H 2 p def = p log1=p + 1 , p log1=1 , p, equals the entropy of a 0-1 random variable with expectation p.
We will make use of two measures of similarity between probability distributions. The first measure is the wellknown statistical difference: The statistical difference between the random variables X and Y , denoted X ; Y , 
The Aiello-Hastad Characterization
In this section, we motivate and state the lemmas which comprise the Aiello-Hastad characterization of statistical zero-knowledge. Proofs can be found in Appendix A.
Intution. Let be any language (or promise problem) in
HVSZK and consider a statistical zero-knowledge proof system for and the corresponding simulator. We think of the output of the simulator as describing the moves of a virtual prover and a virtual verifier. Following Fortnow [10] , the Aiello-Hastad characterization describes properties of the output of the simulator which distinguish between yes instances and no instances. One thing we are guaranteed by the statistical zero-knowledge property is that the simulator outputs accepting conversations with high probability when the input is a yes instance. Thus, if on some input x, the simulator outputs rejecting or invalid conversations with high probability, x is easily identified to be a no-instance.
The difficulty comes from the fact that the simulator might output accepting conversations with high probability even when x is a no-instance, even though this cannot occur when any real prover interacts with the true verifier due to the soundness of the proof system. Intuitively, this discrepancy comes from the fact that the virtual prover has the ability to cheat and "see" future verifier messages, a power which the real prover does not have. Thus, Aiello and Hastad consider what happens when one takes away the power of the virtual prover to cheat. That is, following [10] , they consider a real prover strategy P S , called the simulationbased prover, which determines its messages based on the same distribution as the virtual prover's residual probability space conditioned only on past messages. Now, the interaction between P S and the real verifier describes exactly what happens when we take away the power of the simulated prover to cheat. Thus, the relative entropy between the output of S and the interaction between P S and the real verifier is a measure of the amount of cheating that virtual prover performs, and this distinguishes between yes instances and no instances. The final crucial observation in the AielloHastad characterization is that this relative entropy can be rewritten as a simple expression involving entropies of prefixes of the simulator's output.
Notation. Let be any language (or promise problem) in HVSZK (or weak-HVSZK) and let P;V be a statistical zero-knowledge proof system for with simulator S. Without loss of generality, we assume that on inputs of length n, the verifier tosses exactly`=`n coins, and the interaction between P and V consists of 2r = 2 rn messages, each of length`=`n so that the prover's messages are those with odd index. Also, we may assume that the last message of the verifier consists of its random coins. We are interested in the random variables, hP;Vix and Sx, describing the real interaction and the simulation, respectively. We also consider prefixes of these random variables, where hP;Vix i and Sx i denote the prefix of length i `of the corresponding random variable. At times, we may drop x from these notations. We say that a 2r `bit string is a transcript (w.r.t V ) if the verifier messages in correspond to what it would have sent given the random coins (as specified in the last bits in ) and previous messages of the prover (included in ). We say that a transcript is accepting if the verifier accepts on it.
The simulation-based prover. Given an execution prefix 2 f0; 1g i,1`, the simulation-based prover, denoted P S , responses as follows:
If Sx outputs conversations that begin with with probability 0, then P S replies with a dummy message, say 0` jxj .
Otherwise, P S replies according with the same conditional probability as the prover in the output of the simulator. That is, it replies 2 f 0; 1g` jxj with probability p = P r Sx i = jSx i,1 =
Following our previous notation, we denote conversation transcripts coming from the interaction between P S and V by hP S ; V ix, and its prefixes by hP S ; V ix i .
Rewriting KL Sx j h P S ; V ix. 
HSx 2i , HSx 2i,1
The behaviour of P S on yes instances: Note that even in case of a yes instance, the behaviour of P S need not exactly fit the behavior of either the prescribed prover P or the simulated prover (i.e., the distribution of prover messages in the output of the simulator) . Yet, in the case of yes instance, prover P S behaves "almost" as P and the simulated prover. More generally, simulates a proof system P;V with soundness error 6 6 Recall that the soundness error sn 2 0;1 of an interactive proof system P;V is an upper bound on the probability that the verifier accepts after interacting with any potential prover strategy P on input a no instance of length n. Proof of Theorems 1.3 and 1.7: Let be any promise problem in weak-HVSZK and consider any weak-HVSZK proof system for . Informally, by repeating the proof system polyn times (either sequentially or in parallel) and modifying the proof system and simulator slightly, we can easily satisfy the requirements of Lemma 2.5. Namely, we obtain a proof system with soundness error at most 0:1 in which the last message of the verifier consists of its random coins (as was required throughout the AielloHastad characterization), together with a simulator which always outputs accepting transcripts and has simulator deviation at most 1=2r` 2 . Once these conditions are satisfied, Lemma 2.5 tells us that the map x 7 ! X x ; Y x is a Karp reduction from to ED, yielding Theorem 1.7. Theorem 1.3 then follows as a special case. Below, we do the calculations in more detail to show that the original proof system need only have a simulator achieving deviation smaller than the reciprocal of the (cube of the) total number of bits sent in the proof system (plus the number of coins used by the verifier).
Suppose the proof system for consists of 2r 0 , 1 messages of length m, and let`0 = maxm; q, where q is the number of coins used by the verifier. Assume the proof system has completeness and sounded errors both bounded by 1/3 and simulator deviation r 0`0 ,2 log r 0`0 ,5 . We now modify the proof system by having the verifier send the prover its coins at the end and modify the simulator accordingly. This does not affect the completeness error, soundness error, or simulator deviation. Now there are 2r 0 messages, each of length at most`0. Repeating the proof system for k times (either sequentially or in parallel) and ruling by majority, we obtain two-sided error of exp, k.
Using k = log r 0`0 we obtain a proof system with total communication 2r`= Or 0`0 log r 0`0 , two-sided error 2r` ,2 =2 and simulation error 2r` ,2 =2.
Next, modify the proof system so that 0 2r`b ecomes an accepting transcript, and modify the simulator so that it always outputs an accepting transcript (by possibly substituting the output with 0 2r`) . The resulting proof system has soundness error at most 2 ,`+ 2 r` ,2 =2, and the simulation error is at most 2r` ,2 . Assuming, without loss of generality, that 2 ,`+ 2 r` ,2 =2 0:1, we are in position to apply Lemma 2.5, and the theorems follow.
A public-coin HVSZK proof system for ED
In this section, we prove Theorems 1.4 and 1.8. That is, we present a public-coin honest-verifier statistical zeroknowledge proof system for Entropy Difference (ED). In presenting the proof system, we will use two subprotocols due to Okamoto [20] , which we will describe in Section 4.
In Section 3.1, we give an overview of the proof system. In particular, as a motivation we start by treating a special case of ED in which all distributions are "flat" (i.e., uniform over some subset of their range). We conclude the overview by discussion of the ideas underlying the extension of this special case to the general one. In Section 3.2, we discuss a standard technique for "flattening" distributions, which is an essential part of the final proof system. In Section 3.3, we state the properties of Okamoto's subprotocols that are used in the proof system for ED; the actual description of these subprotocols and their proofs of correctness are deferred to Section 4. Finally, in Section 3.4, we give the proof system for ED and prove its correctness.
Overview
We begin with an exposition of the standard protocol for proving lower bounds on set sizes, which is the starting point for our proof system. We stress that all protocols described in this section (as well as in the rest of the paper) are public-coin protocols.
The standard lower bound protocol
Suppose S is some subset of f0; 1g n and a prover M ("Merlin") wants to convince a verifier A ("Arthur") that jSj 2 m . Assuming A has oracle access to a procedure which tests membership in S, there is a simple public-coin protocol which can be used to accomplish this task. The protocol was first described in [2, 17] and orginates with a lemma of Sipser [25] . For every pair of integers k and`, let H k;`b e a family of 2-universal hash functions mapping f0; 1g k to f0; 1g`. The best analysis of the above protocol was provided in [1] . In fact, this protocol also has a sort of statistical zeroknowledge property. The property holds with respect to the inputs n and m, provided that jSj 2 m and that one is given a uniformly selected element of S. 7 Here 0 is a canonically fixed element of f0; 1g m . 8 In case h ,1 0 S = ; the output is defined to be a special failure symbol.
A simple case of ED
We now sketch how the above lower bound protocol can be used to give a public-coin HVSZK proof system for a simplified version of ED. We call a distribution X flat if all strings in the support of X have the same probability. That is, X is the uniform distribution on some subset of its domain. The simplifying assumptions we make are that we are working with a pair of distributions X and Y (encoded by circuits which sample from them) such that 
.3).
The problem with the above is that it requires the prover to reveal HX and HY (or approximations of these quantities). In fact, the zero-knowledge properties asserted above are relative to the given/asserted lower bound, and do not seem to hold when the bound is not given. Indeed, there seems to be no efficient way for the verifier to approximate the size of S, even when given a membership oracle to S. The last two steps in the above protocol are for M to prove that x is in fact in the support of X. Now it follows immediately from our earlier discussion and the completeness and soundness of the lower bound protocol that this protocol is also complete and sound. The statistical zero-knowledge property of this proof system also follows readily from that of the lower bound protocol. Consider the following simulator:
Simulator for simplified ED proof system, on input X;Y 1. Choose q and r uniformly at random and let x = Xq, y = Y r.
2. Choose h uniformly from fh 2 H n+m;m : hx; r = 0g.
3. Output y;h;x; r; q .
The deviation of this simulator can be analyzed as follows:
The string y is clearly distributed identically in both the proof system and the simulator. In the simulator, conditioned on y, the pair x; r is selected uniformly from S X Y y, and then h is selected uniformly among those that map x; r to 0. In the protocol, conditioned on y, y;h;x; r, the string q is selected uniformly from X x in both distributions, and so it does not increase the statistical difference.
Treating general instances of ED
There are several problems in generalizing the proof system of x3.1.2 to arbitrary instances of ED. Clearly, the simplifying assumptions we made will not hold in general. The assumption that jHX , HY j k is easy to achieve. If we let X 0 (resp., Y 0 ) consist of k independent copies of X (resp., Y ), then HX 0 = k HX (resp., HY 0 = k HY ). So, the difference in entropies is multiplied by k.
The assumption that X and Y are both flat presents more serious difficulties. As we will see, taking many independent copies of each distribution yields distributions that are "nearly flat" (in a sense to be made precise later), but the protocol still needs further modification to work with "nearly flat" rather than truly flat distributions. The first problem is that if Y is only nearly flat, then M may select y to be "too heavy" (i.e., y has probability much greater than 2 ,HY ), allowing him too many choices for r and leading to violation of the soundness property. Similarly, although there are only about 2 HX choices for x that have probability near 2 ,HX , if X is only nearly flat, there may be many more choices for x (alas these are "too light" -i.e., have probability much smaller than 2 ,HX ). This too gives M too much freedom (this time in choice of x) and may lead to violation of the soundness property. In order to solve these problems, we use two subprotocols of Okamoto [20] : The first is a "sample generation" protocol, which is a protocol for M and A to select a sample from a nearly flat distribution Y such that no matter what strategy M uses, the sample will not be too heavy. This will replace Step 1 in the proof system of x3.1.2, and guarantee that M does not have too much freedom in its choice of r (in Step 3). The second protocol is a "sample test" protocol, which is a way for M to prove that a sample x taken from a nearly flat distribution X is not too light. This will replace
Steps 5 and 6 in the proof system of x3.1.2, and guarantee that M does not have too much freedom in its choice of x (in Step 3).
We stress that both of these subprotocols will be publiccoin and will possess appropriate simulability properties to ensure that the resulting protocol for ED is a public-coin HVSZK proof system. In the rest of this section, we will specify the properties of these subprotocols, and formulate and analyze the proof system for ED assuming that these subprotocols exist. In Section 4, we present these subprotocols and prove that they have the asserted properties.
Flattening distributions
As a preliminary step towards treating the general instances of ED, we formulate the process of "flattening" distributions (i.e., making them "nearly flat" by taking many independent copies). A natural relaxed definition of flatness follows. The definition links the amount of slackness allowed in "typical" elements with the probability mass assigned to non-typical elements. 
Definition 3.4 (flat distributions):
The key point is that the entropy of k X grows linearly with k, whereas its deviation from flatness grows significantly more slowy (i.e., linear in p k) as a function of k.
Subprotocol specifications
Below (as above), all distributions are given in form of a circuit which generate them. The input to these protocols will consist of a distribution, denoted X. We will denote by m (resp., n) the length of the input to (resp., output of) the circuit generating the distribution X. In all protocols party A is required to run in polynomial-time (in length of the common input), which means in particular that the total number of bits exchanged in the interaction is so bounded. ; t , such that X is -flat and t , 9 the following holds: 9 The condition t is to simplify the error expressions and will always be satisfied in our applications. The above zero-knowledge property is referred to as strong since the simulator cannot produce a view-output pair by first generating the view and then computing the corresponding output. Instead, the simulator is forced (by the explicit inclusion of x in Distribution (B)) to generate a consistent random view for a given random output (of A). We comment that the trivial protocol in which A uniformly selects an input r to the circuit X and reveals both r and the output x = Xr cannot be used since the simulator is only given x and it may be difficult to find an r yielding x in general. Still, a Sample Generation protocol is implicit in Okamoto's work [20] (where it is called a "Pre-test"). The above zero-knowledge property is referred to as weak since the simulator gets a random r giving rise to x (i.e., x = Xr) as an auxiliary input (whereas A is only given x). We comment that a simple public-coin testing protocol exists in case one can approximate the size of X x and uniformly sample from it. However, this may not be the case in general. Still, a Sample Testing protocol is implicit in Okamoto's work [20] (where it is called a "Post-test").
Theorem 3.9 (implicit in [20] ) There exists a public-coin sample testing protocol. Furthermore, the number of communication rounds in the protocol is linear in q.
A proof of Theorem 3.9 is presented in Section 4.
The protocol for ED
We assume, without loss of generality, that the number of input (resp., output) bits of X equals the number for Y (e.g., by augmenting one circuit by dummy input or output bits). Let m and n denote the corresponding quantities. Furthermore, let s denote the total length of the description of both X and Y . The first step in the following protocol is an "amplification step" which yields distributions which are adequately flat. The protocol uses subprotocols for Sample Generation and Sample Testing as guaranteed by Theorems 3.7 and 3.9, respectively.
Proof system M;A for ED, on input X;Y p k m; p s, and A accepts iff the test was concluded satisfactorily.
We first show that the amplification step (i.e., Step 1) is indeed appropriate. That is, Fact 3.10 Distributions V and W are p k m-flat. 11 Here, and in the rest of the paper, we write use the same notation for a set (e.g., W w) and the uniform distribution on that set. Fact 3.10 is immediate by Lemma 3.5 and the setting of the parameters. Given Fact 3.10, we turn to the essence of the analysis of the protocol. The completeness property of the protocol will follow from the zero-knowledge one, and so we start by establishing the soundness property. The correctness of this simulator will rely on the following variant of the Leftover Hash Lemma [18] , proved in Appendix D. By the strong zero-knowledge property of the Sample Generation protocol, the pair ; w in the output of the simulator has statistical difference at most km 2 , s = 2 , s from a real execution of that protocol. Since W is -flat, the string w is t-light with probability at most 2 , s in the simulator. Thus, we consider the distributions on h; v;r conditioned on any pair ; w such that w is not t-light. To analyze this, we apply Lemma 3.12 with Z = V W w, D = f0; 1g kn+km , and R = f0; 1g km . Distribution (A) (resp., (B)) in Lemma 3.12 corresponds to the distribution of h; v;r in the proof system (resp., simulator). Since V is -flat, the following holds with 12 This step can be efficiently implemented for all popular constructions of 2-universal families (e.g., the linear transformations family). Also note that by the 2-universal property of such families, functions mapping any fixed string to 0 always exist. Test protocol (noting that in the simulator, v is t-light with probability at most 2 ,s+1 and r is distributed uniformly in V v).
Lemmas 3.11 and 3.13 and the fact that the given proof system is public coin immediately imply Theorem 1.8. Theorem 1.4 then follows as a special case. Actually, we can strengthen Theorem 1.8 somewhat by applying a transformation of [11] which converts public-coin honest-verifier statistical zero-knowledge proofs into ones with perfect completeness (i.e., the verifier accepts with probability 1 on yes instances). Their transformation also preserves an exponentially small soundness error and an exponentially small simulator deviation. Thus, we obtain: Corollary 3.14 ED has a public-coin proof system which has perfect completeness and exponentially small soundness error, and can be simulated with exponentially vanishing deviation.
The Sample Generation and Test Protocols
In this section, we present Okamoto's protocols for generating and testing samples from a nearly flat distribution. Recall that these protocols must be public coin and furthermore must satisfy certain "zero-knowledge" properties.
Overview
Sample Generation. Here the input to the protocol M;A is a -flat distribution X (encoded by a circuit) and the output should be a sample x from this distribution. We require that, no matter what strategy M follows, x will not be too heavy. If, however, both parties play honestly, then x should be nearly typical with high probability, and should be simulatable for an externally specified x. In particular, the protocol should not reveal an input to the circuit X that yields x, as the simulator is only given x and it may be difficult to find an input yielding x in general. If we remove this condition, the problem becomes trivial: A could just sample x according to X and reveal both x and the input used to produce it. Since X is nearly flat, x will be nearly typical with high probability.
Okamoto's solution to this problem has the following general structure: M proposes a sample x (which is supposed to be distributed according to X) and sends it to A. follows, he will be forced to choose x 0 that is also not too heavy.
3. If x is nearly typical and M plays honestly, then x 0 will also be nearly typical.
4. If M plays honestly, then A's view of the game is simulatable for an externally specified x 0 .
Clearly, repeating this game many times to obtain a sequence of samples x 0 ; : : : ; x m (where x 0 is proposed by M and x i+1 = x 0 i ) will have the effect of pushing a heavy proposal for x 0 closer and closer to the nearly typical set. Taking m sufficiently large (but still polynomial in the appropriate parameters), x m will be guaranteed to be not too heavy, no matter how M plays. On the other hand, if M plays honestly, all the samples will be nearly typical. Finally, the simulability property of the game enables the entire Sample Generation protocol to be simulated "backwards" for an externally specified x m .
Sample Test.
Here the input to the protcol M;A is a -flat distribution X (encoded by a circuit) together with a string x from the domain of X. At the end of the protocol, A accepts or rejects. We require that if x is too light, A should reject with high probabability. If, however, x is nearly typical and both parties play honestly, then A should accept with high probability, and, moreover, A's view of the interaction should be simulatable (given additionally a random input for X which yields x).
The general structure of this protocol is very similar to that of the Sample Generation protocol. Given x, M and A engage in a short game which ends by M proposing another sample x 0 . Roughly speaking, this game has the following properties:
1. If x is too light, then no matter what strategy M follows, he will be forced to select x 0 which is noticeably lighter than x. 2. If x is nearly typical and M plays honestly, then x 0 will also be nearly typical.
3. If both parties play honestly, then A's view of the game is simulatable (given a random input to X which yields x).
Clearly, repeating this game many times to obtain a sequence x 0 ; : : : ; x m (where x 0 = x and x i+1 = x 0 i ) will have the effect of making a light input sample lighter and lighter. Taking m sufficiently large, x m,1 will be so light that it has zero probability, so there is no x m lighter than x m,1 and A will reject! Notice that we do not care what happens in the pushing game if x i is not too light and M plays dishonestly; if the original input is too light (which is the the only time we worry about a dishonest M), all the subsequent x i 's will also be too light with high probability. On the other hand, if the original input x is nearly typical and M plays honestly, all the samples will be nearly typical. Finally, the simulability property of the game enables the entire Sample Generation protocol to be simulated "forwards" given coins for x. Amazingly, the game used for the Sample Test protocol is identical to the game used for the Sample Generation protocol. We describe this "pushing" game in the next section, and subsequently give formal descriptions of the two protocols.
The pushing game
Throughout the remainder of Section 4, X is a -flat distribution encoded by a circuit and m (resp., n) denotes the length of the input (resp., output) of the circuit generating X. Recall that for positive integers k and`, H k;`d enotes a 2-universal family of hash functions mapping f0; 1g k to f0; 1g`. The lemma follows. Think of X (resp., Y ) as being generated by picking Z 0 with probability 1 , and X 0 (resp., Y 0 ) otherwise. Then, HX 1 , HZ 0 + HX 0 + H 2 HY 1 , HZ 0 Observing that Pr X 0 = x = 0 on at least one x 2 D, it follows that HX 0 logjDj , 1, and the fact follows.
Comment:
The above bound is tight. Let e 2 D and consider X which is identically e, and Y which with probability 1 , equals e and otherwise is uniform over D n f eg. Clearly, X ; Y = and HY , HX = logjDj , 1 + H 2 , 0. where X v (resp., Y v ) denotes the residual distribution of X conditioned on fX = v (resp., Y conditioned on fY = v).
The above bound is in fact equivalent to the Log Sum Inequality (i.e., 
C Proof of the Flattening Lemma
For every x in the support of X, we let wx = , log Pr X = x . Then w maps the support of X, denoted D, to 0; m . Let X 1 ; :::; X k be identical and independent copies of X. The lemma asserts that for every t, Observe that EwX i = P x Pr X = x wx = H X, for every i. Thus, the lemma follows by a straightforward application of Hoeffding Inequality: Specifically, define random variables i = wX i , let = E i and = tm= p k, and use The lemma follows.
D Proof of the Hashing Lemma
We denote the two distributions on pairs h; z in Lemma 3.12 by A = A H ; A Z and B = B H ; B Z . By the definition of statistical difference, it suffices to show that for every set S H D, Pr A 2 S , Pr B 2 S 3 + " 1=3 . In order to do this, we first will argue that for "most" pairs h; z, Pr A = h; z is not too much greater than Pr B = h; z . Observe that both distributions A and B only output pairs h; z such that hz = 0 . Now, for any where the last equality follows from 2-universality.
Thus, showing that Pr A = h; z is not too much greater than Pr B = h; z for most pairs h; z amounts to showing that for most h, (as long as + " 1=3 1=2, which we may assume as otherwise the lemma is trivially satisfied). This completes the proof.
